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Problem: Estimating the risk of terrorism to a 
system depends upon the range of attack 
scenarios available to the adversary. 
Approach: Use logic gate trees (LGTs) to 
represent subject matter expert (SME) 
knowledge in a model that provides the basis for 
the risk analysis. The LGTs are developed using 
the Logic Evolved Decision (LED) methodology.
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Presentation Outline
Background
 Structure of an attack scenario 
 LED model for aviation transportation 
system 
 Scenario groupings, CONOPS and 
technology insertions 
 Expert elicitation
Conclusions
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Background
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Risk-based Prioritization of
NASA Aviation Security Research
• NASA Goal:
– Use a top-down analysis approach to rank order security 
technology investments
• Objective:
– Decision support tool to prioritize aviation security 
research
– Based upon an air transportation system (ATS) risk 
assessment
• Technical Challenges:
– Pioneering development effort
– Security assessments for the entire ATS
– Extensive integration of subject matter experts
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NASA Approach to Aviation Security
Increase effectiveness 
of aviation information 
screening
Harden the National 
Airspace System
Electronic Nose
Secure and protect 
the aircraft 
Aircraft
Airspace
Airports
Integrate 
advanced 
sensors 
throughout
the system
Secure vehicle CNS 
systems
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Assessing Air Transportation System Riski i i i
4 ATS Divided into Three Sub-
systems
4 Aircraft Further Decomposed into 
Federal Aviation Regulation Parts
Risk Assessment Approach 
to Aviation Security
Aircraft
Part 121 Passenger/Cargo
Part 121 All Cargo
Part 135
Part 91
Airport
Airspace
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Structure of a Terrorist Attacki
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An Attack Scenario Is A Process
Target
Selection Planning Logistics Assault
Target
Response
Attacker For the ATS a very large number of scenarios are 
possible
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LED Models for the ATS
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Possible Scenarios Are Generated 
Using LGTs with LED
i l i
i i
1. Develop a Possibility Tree
 Composed of elements of a process
 Logical operators (i.e., and / or) connect elements
 Deduction facilitates capturing a large set of possible 
scenarios
2. Solve the Possibility Tree
 Generate scenarios from logically linked elements
 Prune the tree to develop a spanning set of 
scenarios
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Aircraft
Airspace
Airports
LGTs allow for convenient 
modularization of the 
attack space
Super Tree for the ATS
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Attacks on passengers and crew
Attacks on the aircraft
Aircraft as enabling system
Possibility Tree for Part 121 
PC Attack Scenarios
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Target
Sub-trees Consider Specific Types of Attacks
Weapon
Logistics
Assault
Target 
Response
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Airport Treei
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Airspace Treei
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Attack on the US aviation system. Attack is against the commercial aviation 
system. The targeted system is classified as a Part 121 air-carrier operation. The 
air-carrier operation handles passenger and cargo traffic. The attack targets the 
aircraft. The attack is on the airframe. The attack originates external to the aircraft. 
The attack involves weaponry. The weapon used is a man-portable missile. The 
attacker acquires the weapon system. The attacker transports the missile system 
to the attack site. The attacker acquires the target. The attacker fires the missile. 
The missile flies to the target. The missile warhead detonates. The attacker group 
consists of outsiders only.
The Possibility-Tree Solution Gives a 
Comprehensive Set of Attack Scenarios
Attack scenarios appear in 
natural language form for 
use with SMEs
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Attack scenarios can also 
be visualized as a digraph
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Scenario Groupings, CONOPS and 
Technology Insertions
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Type of Attack
Number of 
Scenarios Example
Attack on crew or passengers 4 Dispersion of chemical agent in passenger 
compartment
Attack on airframe 20 Missile attack with man-portable system
Attack on critical on-board systems 20 Jamming or spoofing of navigational aids
Use of aircraft as an enabling system for 
weapons-of-mass-destruction attack
4 Variations of 9/11 World Trade Center 
attack
Summary Attack Scenarios in Spanning 
Set for Part 121 PC Aircraft
Similar spanning sets were 
developed for airports and the 
air space in consultation with 
SMEs
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A Scenario / Technology Crosswalki l l
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Concepts of Operation Define Technology Insertion Pointst  f r ti  fi  l  I rti  i t
CONOPS for Damage 
Adaptive Controls on 
Aircraft
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The Role of Expert Elicitation
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Many Different Types of SMEs 
Participated in the Analysis
i
i i i l i
• National Institute of Aerospace (NIA)
• Aviation System Expert Consultants
• Aviation Operations
• Pilots
• Airport Managers
• Air Traffic Controllers
• Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)
• Electromagnetic Effects Expertise
• NASA Aviation Security Research Projects
• Research Project Input to Analysis
• Volpe Center Department of Transportation (Volpe)
• Cost/Benefit Studies
• Experts on terrorism from various agencies
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SME Rolesl
 Definition of system for analysis
 Development of attack scenario possibility 
trees
 Selection of spanning sets
 Revision of trees and sets based upon 
initial risk assessment
 Development of CONOPS and 
identification of technology insertion points
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Conclusions
 To be meaningful, terrorist risk analyses must have a 
well-defined set of attack scenarios
 Logic gate trees provide a structured approach to scenario 
development
 The possibility tree contains a very large set of scenarios
 Spanning sets can be developed for different purposes
 An LGT model can be extended to incorporate 
CONOPS and to help define technology 
requirements
 Terrorist risk analysis is highly dependent on SME 
knowledge
 Possibility trees are an efficient way to integrate large 
amounts of expert knowledge
 A tree can be easily updated to reflect new information or 
modified as a result of SME interactions
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